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Kant suggests that his contribution to philosophy 
is analogous to the contribution of Copernicus to as-
tronomy—each involves the revolutionary reorientation 
of a discipline. Kant describes his revolution as the 
move from taking objects to be determinative of know-
ledge to taking knowledge to be determinative of 
objects. This revolution should be seen in its proper 
context; it is Kant's response to such philosophers as 
Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, and Hume. Descartes initi-
ated a new approach to philosophy, a new method, where 
the central concern of this approach was epistemologi-
cal. Descartes posed the questions about the possibil-
ity and certainty of knowledge which philosophers 
through Kant regarded as fundamental. With respect to 
philosophy done within this epistemological context, 
Kant's contribution is revolutionary in showing the 
concept of an object to be dependent on the conditions 
for the knowledge of objects. Kant is, in a stronger 
way, also revolutionary with respect to philosophy 
which preceded the epistemological context. Kant makes 
the most of the new method he shares with Descartes; he 
does not only, with Descartes, take epistemology to be 
fundamental to philosophy, but he also recognizes that 
the notion of an object must itself be an epistemologi-
cal notion. 
I wish first to provide something of a characteri-
zation of the epistemological method in philosophy. To 
the extent that the characterization is successful, it 
will support the claim that there is such a common 
method. Whether or not the method is fully shared with 
anyone else, however, I wish to explicate its role in 
Kant's critical philosophy. 
Philosophy has long laid special claim to being 
rigorous. It has claimed a role comparable only to 
mathematics in developing consistent, if not certain, 
systems of thought. In reflecting upon itself, philo-
sophy must reflect upon logic or logical reasoning, and 
in doing this it must provide an interpretation of nec-
essary connection. The interpretation chosen affects 
to a very great degree the perception which philosophy 
has of itself, its task, and its method. There appear 
to be three sorts of interpretations which can be 
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chosen. Aristotle, for example, finds the primary sort 
of necessity to be causal necessity between things in 
the world. Syllogistic necessity is interpreted as 
causal necessity. Descartes assumes a psychological 
interpretation of necessity. Reasoning should procede 
only by way of such connections as cannot be thought 
otherwise if one's conclusions are to be logically cer-
tain. If two ideas can be thought other than as con-
nected, that is, if their connection can be doubted, 
then necessary reasoning will not depend on the con-
nection. Wittgenstein displays a third interpretation 
when he says that all necessity is linguistic. 
Kant assumes a psychological interpretation of 
necessity. The interpretation is psychological in a 
broad sense, psychological as opposed to physical or 
linguistic. Something is necessary if it cannot be 
thought otherwise. This is subjective necessity. It 
has to do with what can or cannot be thought, not with 
what can or cannot be. If necessity is primarily psy-
chological, then physical and linguistic necessity, if 
there be such, must be understood in terms of psy-
chological necessity. If necessity is primarily sub-
jective, then objective necessity, if there be such, 
must be understood in terms of subjective necessity. 
It is in a methodological sense that psychological 
necessity is prior to any other necessity. To say that 
psychological necessity is primary is to claim that it 
must be first in the order of understanding, or at 
least, to suggest that it be taken as such. It is not 
in itself a claim that psychological necessity has 
other than subjective validity, although it must argua-
bly lead to such a claim. The choice of a psychologi-
cal interpretation is a beginning point of philosophy, 
a fundamental choice of method, not the sort of thing 
which can be argued for, although the choice is presu-
mably dependent on the prospects for profitable em-
ployment of the method. With the choice of the psy-
chological interpretation comes the epistemological 
problem as fundamental. This problem is the problem of 
the establishment of the objective necessity of subjec-
tively necessary conclusions. Objective necessity must 
either be argued for from subjective necessity, or 
abandoned. Descartes offered a theistic version of 
such an argument; Hume abandoned objective necessity. 
The epistemological problem must, in the Cartesian con-
text, be dealt with before any other, because the way 
in which reason applies cannot be understood until ob-
jective necessity is either established or abandoned. 
The psychological interpretation takes necessity to 
be first understandable as necessary connection between 
mental entities, or representations. Representations 
which cannot be separated in thought are necessarily 
connected. The thought of the one makes the thought of 
the other in some sense unavoidable. Necessary connec-
tion might not be immediately evident. It might well 
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be quite difficult to determine whether or not two re-
presentations are necessarily connected, and some sort 
of close introspective examination which methodically 
attempts the separation might well have to be under-
taken. Necessary connection, however, does not depend 
on its recognition as such. Someone might well be 
mistaken in his judgements of necessary connection even 
though this judgement requires only introspective 
examination. Representations, it is assumed, are per-
fectly definite entities, and their inter-relations do 
not depend on being recognized. Another important as-
sumption is that error can, with care, be avoided. The 
mind is open to its own inspection, and if it will only 
procede with all possible caution it will avoid in-
trospective error. 
Kant calls representations "modifications of the 
mind."1 Intuitions and concepts are both representa-
tions.2 Intuitions are representations of objects; 
concepts are representations of representations. A 
single concept subsumes many representations. Judge-
ments subsume representations under concepts, and are 
the sorts of things which can be true or false, anal-
ytic or synthetic, a priori or a posteriori, necessary 
or contingent. 
The notion of a necessary judgement is Kant's fun-
damental notion of necessity. It is this notion which 
is Kant*8 understanding or interpretation of logical 
necessity. Logical necessity is for Kant something 
psychological, or conceptual; it is neither substantial 
nor linguistic. Because the notion of a necessary 
judgement is fundamental, it is not very descriptive of 
necessary judgements to say that they are judgements 
which are logically necessary. Logical necessity must 
itself be understood either as substantial, psychologi-
cal, or linguistic necessity; and Kant has chosen to 
understand it as psychological necessity. To say, 
then, that a necessary judgement is a judgement which 
is logically necessary is to seek to explain one notion 
by another which is dependent on it. 
A necessary judgement is a judgement of a matter 
which cannot be thought otherwise. Said this simply, 
however, it sounds as though judgements contrary to 
necessary judgements are never made. Such judgements— 
that is, logical errors—are of course made regularly. 
There is then a sense in which the matter of a neces-
sary judgement can be thought otherwise. In another 
sense, however, it cannot be thought otherwise. This 
sense depends on the identification of a set of ideal 
conditions of judgement under which no judgements con-
trary to necessary judgements can be made. Logical er-
rors, that is, could not be made under such ideal 
conditions. Descartes is suggestive of the sorts of 
conditions that would constitute ideal conditions. The 
conditions would surely include Descartes' criteria of 
certainty, namely clarity and distinctness of concep-
483 
tion. Judgements concerning concepts the conceptions 
of which are recognizably unclear can easily be thought 
otherwise, that is, they are not necessary. Descartes 
seems to suggest that, if only we can get the appropri-
ate concepts perfectly clear, we will not err in our 
judgements. Judgements made under ideal conditions are 
judgements made on the basis of concepts alone, for it 
is only with concepts that the requisite clarity can be 
hoped for. 
All necessary judgements are a priori, and all a 
priori judgements are necessary. A priori judgements 
are such judgements as Kant calls pure, or free from 
any empirical element. These judgements are not made 
on the basis of any particular experience, nor do they 
depend on any other judgements so made.1 A judgement 
which is not a priori is called a posteriori. Necessa-
ry judgements are judgements which cannot be thought 
otherwise, but any judgement made on the basis of ex-
perience can be thought otherwise. If on the basis of 
experience one representation is subsumed under ano-
ther, the judgement could be otherwise because the em-
pirical element can be thought otherwise. It is just 
in case a judgement is not based on experience that 
there is nothing about the judgement which can be 
thought otherwise and the judgement is necessary. 
A judgement is analytic if it is explicative of a 
concept; synthetic, if it connects a representation 
with another which is not a part of it. Concepts are 
rules for the introduction of unity into a manifold.* 
They are rules according to which different representa-
tions are treated as identical in some respect. Con-
cepts synthesize diversity into unity. Concepts may be 
quite complex; the sum total of a variety of distin-
guishable rules functioning together. As a more com-
plex rule incorporates simpler rules, so a complex 
concept incorporates, or includes, simpler concepts. 
The simpler are internal to the complex. A complex 
concept is dependent on those internal to it in a way 
in which they are not dependent on it. The use of the 
more simple does not involve the use of the more com-
plex as its use does theirs. Saying that one concept 
is internal to another means only that the use of the 
latter involves the use of the former; it does not mean 
that the former can only be used in the latter. A con-
cept can be confusedly thought; that is, the concepts 
internal to it might not be recognized as such.* One 
concept might not be recognized to depend on other 
concepts when it does in fact depend on them, just as 
it might not be recognized that the following of one 
rule involves the following of certain others. An 
analytic judgement is a clarification of a concept. It 
is the recognition that a certain predicate concept is 
internal to a subject concept. The subject concept in-
corporates, or depends on, the predicate concept. 
Because an analytic judgement only recognizes this 
484 
dependence, it adds nothing to the subject concept. 
That is, it does not further qualify or determine the 
subject. An analytic judgement does not mark off a 
limited use of the subject concept—a use restricted by 
the predicate concept—but recognizes an element of the 
subject concept which is common to its every possible 
use. An analytic judgement is a necessary judgement 
because the (clear) thought of the subject involves the 
thought of the predicate. An analytic judgement cannot 
be thought otherwise. 
Judgements are either analytic or synthetic. Syn-
thetic judgements, instead of discovering a second con-
cept in a first, bring together two representations ex-
ternal to one-another. A predicate is not found in, 
but added to, a subject. A synthetic judgement makes a 
further qualification of the subject, which is thought 
to be, not just itself (as it would be in an analytic, 
or identical, judgement), but something else as well. 
The use of the concept as so judged is a use restricted 
by the predicate concept. 
Every judgement is either a priori or a posteriori 
and either analytic or sythetic. No judgement, can be 
analytic a posteriori.' Analytic judgements depend 
only on the clear recognition of concepts, but a poste-
riori judgements are based on experience. All analytic 
judgements are a priori. All a posteriori judgements 
are therefore synthetic. Both a priori analytic judge-
ments and a posteriori synthetic judgements are possi-
ble, and the bases for making them are easily seen. 
Analytic judgements are made when the understanding 
gives consideration to its own concepts. The basis of 
an analytic judgement is the clear thought of a con-
cept, for an analytic judgement is a judgement only of 
what is internal to a concept. Synthetic judgements 
connect a subject with an external predicate, a concept 
not thought in the thought of the subject. Synthetic 
judgements cannot therefore be based simply on the 
thought, however clear, of the subject. The under-
standing must discover the connection somewhere else, 
in something other than the concepts judged. Experi-
ence can provide a basis for synthetic judgements, thus 
connecting concepts which are not internally connected, 
but judgements based on experience are a posteriori 
synthetic. 
Analytic judgements are paradigms of necessary 
judgements. The thought of the subject cannot be 
separated from the thought of the predicate. Analytic 
judgements do not go beyond concepts; they are not 
judgements about experience, but judgements about the 
possibilities of thought. An analytic judgement simply 
points out that one concept is internal to another and 
that it is therefore unavoidable that any use of the 
latter concept involve the use of the former. The 
ground of an analytic judgement is the identity which a 
concept has with itself, and it is because no concept 
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can be thought as other than itself that an analytic 
judgement is a necessary judgement. The ground of an 
analytic judgement is a connection internal to a con-
cept. 
Concepts external to one-another can also be con-
nected. When the connection is a matter of experi-
ence—a matter, that is, of conjunctions of intui-
tions—the synthetic judgement of the connection is 
never necessary, because the various intuitions can al-
ways be imagined separate. A posteriori synthetic 
judgements are not necessary judgements because, as 
Hume shows, any two impressions, though conjoined in 
experience, can be separated in thought. Are there, 
however, any synthetic judgements which are necessary? 
Are there any connections which cannot be thought 
otherwise between concepts external to one-another? 
Since only a priori judgements can be necessary, the 
question concerns the possibility of a priori synthetic 
judgements. 
The basis of an a priori synthetic judgement could 
not be the identity of a concept, else the judgement 
would be analytic; nor the conjunction of intuitions, 
else it would be a posteriori and not necessary. A 
priori synthetic judgements can be shown possible only 
by finding some other ground on the basis of which 
judgements can be made. Objects are the sorts of 
things of which we are given appearances through intui-
tion and to which concepts apply. Objects, however, 
cannot provide the ground of any judgements. The un-
derstanding does not have direct access to objects, but 
only to appearances of objects, and any judgement based 
on appearances is contingent. Connections of appear-
ances can always be thought different. 
Hume found no ground for a priori synthetic judge-
ments, but he did show that objects themselves could 
not ground judgements. On Hume's account, there is no 
difference between an idea of an object, and an idea of 
that object as existent.7 Hume distinguishes internal 
from external objects. An object is said to be inter-
nal if it is directly present to the mind. Impressions 
and ideas are such objects. An object is said to be 
external if it can only be presented to the mind 
through perception. An external object is indirectly 
present with the mind when the mind has an impression 
of it. The impression of an external object is an in-
ternal object immediately present to the mind. The 
idea of external existence is the idea of continued and 
distinct existence.* If an existence is not inter-
rupted by, or dependent on, perception, then that ex-
istence is external. That a given existence is exter-
nal cannot, of course, be discovered through percep-
tion. Perception cannot discover whether something ex-
ists when not perceived. Objects are thought as having 
external existence only because of the constancy and 
coherence of their impressions. External existence is 
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not discovered, only supposed. Because external ex-
istence, or objectivity, is not something that can be 
discovered, and there is no difference between the idea 
of an object and the idea of that object as existent, 
not objects as existent, but only objects as perceived, 
can ground judgements. 
The Humean description of the idea of an (external) 
object has two main elements. An object has a certain 
unity (it is one object, not many), and it has conti-
nued and distinct existence. The idea of continued and 
distinct existence is due solely to certain relations 
between impressions, namely, constancy and coherence.' 
This idea is not the idea of constancy and coherence, 
but is a supposition caused by these relations. Unity 
is also requisite of an object. Before something can 
be thought to have external existence, it must be 
thought as a unity. Hume discovers a strong principle 
of unity operative in human understanding: 
We have observed, that whatever objects are dif-
ferent are also distinguishable, and that what-
ever objects are distinguishable are separable by 
the thought and imagination. And we may here 
add, that these propositions are equally true in 
the inverse, and that whatever objects are separ-
able are also distinguishable, and that whatever 
objects are distinguishable are also different.1' 
Because any two impressions which have been imagina-
tively associated together can be again separated, this 
principle declares that each impression is the impres-
sion of a different object. This is a principle of 
subjective necessity. No connections between impres-
sions or ideas are subjectively necessary. Any two im-
pressions or ideas can be imagined separate. The 
strict Humean notion of an object is a notion of that 
of which there can be only one impression. Clearly, 
such a notion cannot provide an account of the way in 
which all sorts of things which do not meet this strict 
criterion of unity are nevertheless commonly considered 
to be objects. Hume therefore proceeds to describe the 
weakening of the principle of unity by another prin-
ciple operative in human understanding, namely, the 
tendency of the imagination to associate closely relat-
ed impressions.11 The imagination commonly treats as a 
unity that which is actually only a collection of im-
pressions. These weak unities are then feigned to re-
present individual objects. The many things which we 
commonly consider objects have no necessary unity. An 
idea of such an object is nothing but the result of 
pretending that a collection of related impressions has 
a continued existence distinct from perception. 
A synthetic judgement based on an idea of an object 
depends on the unity of that idea. Only if this unity 
is a necessary unity can the judgement be necessary. 
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Hume finds no such unity. The strict principle of 
unity finds necessary unity only in indivisible impres-
sions. If, however, no separations are possible, then 
there can be no synthetic judgements based on that 
unity. The weaker sort of unity allows for synthetic 
judgements, but the necessity of the unity disappears. 
With neither notion of unity are necessary synthetic 
judgements possible. 
Kant finds two grounds for necessary synthetic 
judgements: pure intuitions and the concept of an ob-
ject in general. 1 2 All appearances cannot but exhibit 
the forms of intuition. These forms are subjectively 
necessary in that a condition on something being an ap-
pearnce is that it exhibit them. A pure intuition is 
an intuition which has no empirical element; that is, 
it is a particular form or rule of intuition. Human 
beings are, as it happens, so constituted that space 
and time are the forms of their intuition. Every ap-
pearance is thought as being structured by time, the 
form of inner sense. Those appearances which are given 
through outer sense are also thought as structured by 
space. Space and time are neither concepts nor fea-
tures of things-in-themselves, but ways in which the 
intuition orders appearances. Appearances, spatially 
and temporally structured, are the material provided to 
the understanding. A particular spatial or temporal 
arrangement without sensible content is a pure intui-
tion. What we might loosely call arithmetical and geo-
metrical objects are pure intuitions. Pure intuitions 
can be constructed independently of experience. Each 
construction proceeds according to the rule of some 
particular arithmetical or geometrical concept. 
Pure intuitions are grounds of necessary synthetic 
judgements. Two geometrical concepts which are exter-
nal to one-another may nevertheless be judged neces-
sarily connected provided that they are connected in a 
pure intuition. When geometrical judgements are made, 
a pure intuition is constructed in accordance with the 
rule which is the subject concept. Should this intui-
tion be recognized to fall under the predicate concept, 
it becomes evident that whatever satisfies the subject 
concept also satisfies the predicate concept, because 
every appearance is constructed in accordance with the 
forms of intuition, and it is just that form which is 
examined when a pure intuition constructed according to 
one concept is seen to fall under another. The connec-
tion of two concepts in a pure intuition is a priori 
and hence necessary. Synthetic judgements grounded in 
pure intuitions are necessary just because the exhibi-
tion of the forms of intuition is a condition on some-
thing being an appearance. 
The concept of an object in general is the concept 
of that something, distinct from representations, of 
which there may be many representations. The concept 
of the unity of these many representations is the 
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concept of an object. Hume was correct in arguing that 
the objectivity of an object is precisely that about 
the object which could never be perceived. Objects as 
things-in-themselves are wholly unknowable; it is only 
as objects are represented that they can be known. An 
object makes necessary a certain unity among represen-
tations, that is, the concept of unity among represen-
tations is analytic of the concept of an object in gen-
eral. This unity is only possible as a synthetic uni-
ty. The concept of an object is a rule for the synthe-
sis of a manifold. It is only because the unity of an 
object is a synthetic unity that the unity of expe-
rience is possible. The unity of apperception which is 
analytic of the concept of experience presupposes the 
synthetic unity of an object. The concepts according 
to which intuitions are united are necessarily objec-
tively valid because it is precisely the synthetic 
unity thus created that is thought as an object. The 
concept of an object in general is necessarily con-
nected with another concept, that of the unity of ap-
perception. These concepts are not analytically, but 
synthetically connected. 
The concept of an object in general, necessarily 
connected to the concept of the unity of experience as 
mine, provides a basis for many a priori synthetic 
judgements. The unity of experience is synthetically 
provided by the forms of intuition and understanding. 
These forms are necessarily exhibited by everything in-
sofar as it is thought as an object. That only can be 
an object to us which exhibits these forms. The forms 
of intuition are space and time; the forms of under-
standing are the categories. Objects exhibit to the 
understanding their unity as objects in their exhibi-
tion of the forms of intuition and understanding. This 
unity is a synthetic unity. Because the unity required 
by each object turns out to be precisely the synthetic 
unity given it by the forms of intuition and under-
standing, the concepts of the forms of intuition and 
the concepts which are the categories of understanding 
apply a priori and necessarily to each object. Con-
cepts which are not analytically connected may be found 
to be necessarily connected by the concept of an object 
in general. Not because of what is internal to a given 
concept, but because of what is required by the very 
possibility of experience, might it be impossible to 
think that concept other than as connected to some 
other concept. There is, in other words, another 
ground for necessary synthetic judgements in addition 
to the grounds found in pure intuitions. This ground 
is the synthetic character of an object as the neces-
sary presupposition of the actual unity of appercep-
tion. 
Kant's fundamental notion of necessity, I have sug-
gested, is a notion of subjective necessity. The 
necessity of an analytic judgement is the paradigm of 
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subjective necessity, because the ground of an analytic 
judgement is clearly a subjective, or conceptual, 
ground. The subject concept of an analytic judgement 
grounds that judgement. The subject concept makes 
analytic judgements subjectively necessary. Synthetic 
judgements are different. Neither of the concepts con-
nected in a synthetic judgement are capable of making 
the judgement subjectively necessary. In discovering 
that the concept of an object in general makes certain 
synthetic judgements subjectively necessary, the tran-
scendental deduction not only establishes the possibil-
ity of necessary synthetic judgements, but it also es-
tablishes a new notion of necessity. This new notion 
is a notion of objective necessity. Something is ob-
jectively necessary if it is required by the possibil-
ity of objects. Subjectively necessary judgements 
grounded on the concept of an object in general are 
judgements of objective necessity. 
The concept of an object in general is the concept 
of what something must be if it is to be an object. It 
is the concept of something experienced as a unity. 
Only that which conforms to the forms of intuition and 
understanding can be an object. The concept of an ob-
ject in general is the concept of a certain unity, a 
unity which can only be provided by the forms of intui-
tion and understanding. It is necessary that, if 
something is to be an object, it exhibit this synthetic 
unity. Each individual object makes necessary a cer-
tain unity; that is to say, its very character as an 
object is dependent on the way in which its concept 
unifies intuitions according to the categories. It is 
not the particular unity which is necessary; but the 
fact that the particular concept introduce a synthetic 
unity according to the categories. Synthetic judge-
ments grounded on the concept of an object in general 
are objectively necessary because each particular ob-
ject cannot but satisfy the concept of an object in 
general. 
The critical character of Kant's philosophy is but 
another side of the radical re-orientation which is ef-
fected in the notion of an object. The re-orientation 
is encapsulated in the description of an object as 
"that in the concept of which a manifold is united." 
The unity which constitutes an object is a conceptual 
unity; it is a unity placed upon indeterminate things 
by the perceiving and understanding subject. Not ob-
jects as things-in-themselves, but only objects as ap-
pearances have any unity or any determinate character. 
Hume recognized some of this. He understood that the 
only sort of unity among things of which persons can 
have knowledge is such unity as is somehow placed upon 
those things. Only a subjectively constructed unity is 
a knowable unity. Hume therefore went to great lengths 
to describe how it is that the human understanding con-
structs the unity which is constitutive of an object. 
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Hume failed to discover how to establish objective 
necessity on the basis of subjective necessity. He 
made a tremendous step in the right direction, however, 
by avoiding the path taken by Descartes, Leibniz, 
Newton, and others. These philosophers did not realize 
that the epistemological project of establishing objec-
tive necessity on the basis of subjective necessity 
could not be consistently carried out by introducing a 
non-epistemological notion of objectivity. To attempt 
to found a notion of objectivity on a non-epistemolog-
ical notion of substance is to proceed in a speculative 
and dogmatic fashion. Such notions have nothing to do 
with the discovery of the principles and limits of 
human understanding. The Kantian re-orientation in the 
notion of an object is not speculative but critical. 
Kant does not simply pose one more alternative which 
can be placed alongside atoms and monads as a conceptu-
ally (subjectively) possible ground of the unity con-
stitutive of objects. Kant's alternative is not so 
much an alternative as it is a solution. It is a con-
ceptual, not a substantial, solution, for it discovers 
in the concept of an object the ground of objective 
unity. It discovers a subjective ground of objective 
necessity. Kant's alternative is a solution in that it 
discovers that which is necessary for the possibility 
of unity in experience instead of uncritically suggest-
ing another conceptually un-necessary ground of unity. 
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